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Using previously unknown evidence from contemporary onlookers (both famous 
and little-known), this essay identifies and classifies the major references to 
‘Revolution’ in eighteenth-century Britain. At the start, the most common 
category of comments referred to abrupt political-regime change. The ‘Happy 
Revolution’ or what became later known as ‘the Glorious Revolution’ of 1688/9 
was the prototype. This political terminology was revived in the 1770s, to 
denote, whether in praise or blame, the American colonists’ revolt and, after 
1789, the massive upheavals in France. 
 Alongside that, a much less well known strand of commentary referred to 
social and cultural change in terms of ‘revolution’ or ‘the world turned upside 
down’. The meanings of this usage are probed to show that it encompassed 
some elements of change (commercial, cultural) that historians commonly label 
as ‘evolutionary’.  
 Furthermore, there was a new category of comment in the later 
eighteenth century, which referred to economic transformation. These industrial 
usages borrowed much more from earlier social applications than from 
references to political processes, although both shared the same word. Hence 
there was a late eighteenth-century/ early nineteenth-century language of 
‘industrial revolution’ or equivalent long before Toynbee in 1881 named 
Britain’s transformation as ‘THE Industrial Revolution’.  
 Finally, the essay explores the potential confusions between the different 
applications of ‘revolution’ in the eighteenth century. Given the diverse modes 
of change, from micro- to macro-, historians need a new and better vocabulary 
to differentiate between the rival strands. Forcing political, cultural, social, 
sexual and economic ‘revolutions’ into one universal mould obscures more than 









Revolution – Revollusion in this strikingly mis-spelt version from Berlin – is a word and, 
more importantly, a concept of great potency. It appears and reappears in many historic 
contexts and always offers a challenge to interpreters.
2
 So it was in the eighteenth century. So 
it has continued thereafter. And so today it should stimulate analysts to broaden the 
vocabulary of dramatic change to incorporate Revolution in all its variants. 
 For some literary theorists and anthropologists, sometime back, the power of words in 
their deepest structures was summarised by the formula that ‘language determines 
consciousness’. Most historians, coming from a deeply empirical discipline, refrain from 
engaging with such abstract formulations. Even those most sympathetic to the linguistic turn 
tend to be unwilling to grant language or the ‘linguistic episteme’ supremacy over everything. 
After all, human history existed in the many long eons before either speech or writing was 
developed. Hence when historians do reflect upon these theoretical debates, they tend to 
prefer the alternative formulation that ‘consciousness determines language’.
3
  
                                                          
2
  P. Calvert, Revolution (London, 1970); idem, Revolution and Counter-Revolution (Milton Keynes, 1990); 
and I. Kramnick, ‘Reflections on Revolution: Definitions and Explanations in Recent Scholarship’, History 
and Theory, 11 (1972), pp. 26-63, provide good introductions. 
3
  Compare G. Deutscher, Through the Language Glass: Why the World Looks Different in Other Languages 
(New York, 2010); with warning against absolutising language from Alexander Spirkin, ‘Consciousness and 
Language’, in his Dialectical Materialism (1983), 3.3, in www.marxists.org/reference/archive/spirkin/works. 
See also J.A. Lucy, Language Diversity and Thought: A Reformulation of the Linguistic Relativity 
Hypothesis (Cambridge, 1992); W. Croft, Typology and Universals (Cambridge, 1990); S. Pinker, The 
Time for Revollusion by Nasan Tur: 
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 That said, once words/concepts do appear, they often contribute a potency of their 
own. Hence it is much more feasible, ultimately, to think in terms of a rich dialectical 
interchange between consciousness and language. People develop new terms to describe new 
circumstances and new imaginings. But then powerful words/ concepts also acquire sticking-
power – even too much so. Later generations thus may have a struggle to break from old 
terminologies and to reinvent their language.   
 
Political Revolution 
In the case of Revolution, the word itself was far from new in the seventeenth-century. It was 
used in English and numerous other European languages to refer to the regular turnings of a 
wheel or, in the sixteenth century, to the newly-discovered orbits of the planets around the 
sun.
4
 A long-established model of political change in history, derived from the classical 
world, also proposed that systems of governments changed in a merry-go-round. They 
revolved from the rule of one – to the rule of the few – to the rule of the many – and back to 
the rule of one – and so on, ad infinitum. In practice, changes were often variegated. 
Aristotle, for example, noted that a revolution could refer either to a significant adaptation of 
an existing constitution or to a complete switch from one type of constitution to another.
5
 
Yet, however multifarious, cyclical models usefully contained both change and ultimate 
continuity, putting short-term upheavals into a deeper pattern.  
 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the term ‘Revolution’ was pressed into use in England at 
the time of the mid-seventeenth-century civil wars. Things were manifestly changing. In 
1654, Oliver Cromwell was one who referred, approvingly, to God’s revolutions: ‘The Lord 
hath done such things amongst us as have not been known in the world these thousand 
years’.
6
 In this case, he was clearly thinking of not only of a beneficial transformation but 
also of an unrepeatable moment in world history. Others, like the little-known pamphleteer 
William Beech, were less cheery. He deplored England’s ‘present distempers’ as produced by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Language Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind (New York, 1994); and, for historians’ debates, 
E.A. Clark, History, Theory Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Cambridge, Mass., 2004). 
4
  Famously by Nicolaus Copernicus, De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium: On the Revolutions of the 
Celestial Spheres (1543). 
5
  Aristotle, The Politics , transl. J.A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth, 1962), p. 190: Bk V, ch.1.  
6
  Cromwell’s speech at dissolution of his first Parliament, 27 Jan. 1654, in C. Hill, God’s Englishman: Oliver 
Cromwell and the English Revolution (London, 1970), p. 251. For other mid-seventeenth-century usages, see 
also  C. Hill, ‘The Word “Revolution” in  Seventeenth-Century England’, in R. Ollard and P. Tudor-Craig (eds), 
For Veronica Wedgwood, These: Studies in Seventeenth-Century History (London, 1986), pp. 143-51. 
5 
 
‘the late revolution of government in this nation’ (1651).
7
 Beech’s meaning was Aristotelian 
rather than eschatological – referring to the constitutional change from executed monarchy to 
the new republican Commonwealth under the Rump Government (1649-53). Such usages, 
however, remained comparatively rare. The celebrated – and contested – designations of the 
mid-seventeenth-century upheavals as the ‘Puritan Revolution’ (S.R. Gardiner)
8
 or the 
‘English Revolution’ (T.H. Green; Christopher Hill)
9
 were the handiwork of much later 
historians.  
 It was instead the constitutional upheavals of 1688/9 which brought the term into 
wider currency and a new meaning. The challenge to James II by his son-in-law (and 
nephew) William of Orange led to the overthrow of an anointed king. The country’s 
governance did not collapse. But James II, realising that he could not halt the intruder, fled to 
France. In his place, a specially constituted Convention Parliament not only established the 
joint monarchy of William III and his wife Mary II but significantly amended the framework 
of government. The 1689 Bill of Rights (note the assertive title) enacted a number of 
constitutional principles, although it did not introduce a fully written constitution.
10
  And the 
1689 Act of Toleration for the first time established, by law, freedom of worship for all 




By any token, these were dramatic changes. Within months, writers were saluting the 
‘Great Revolution’.
12
 The bloodless nature of William’s progression across England was 
particularly welcomed, in contrast to the divisive civil wars of the 1640s.
13
 Other positive 
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  W. Beech, A View of England’s Present Distempers, Occasioned by the Late Revolution of Government in 
this Nation … (London, 1650). 
8
  S.R. Gardiner, The First Two Stuarts and the Puritan Revolution, 1603-60 (London, 1908). 
9
  T.H. Green, Four Lectures on the English Revolution (London, 1912); later revived by C. Hill (ed.), The 
English Revolution, 1640: Three Essays (London, 1940). Hill also identified the English Revolution as a 
classic ‘bourgeois’ revolution: see C. Hill and E. Dell (eds), The Good Old Cause: The English Revolution of 
1640-60 – Its Causes, Course and Consequences (London, 1949); in second edn, with introduction by C. 
Hill (London, 1969), pp. 20-4, 470-6; and C. Hill, Reformation to Industrial Revolution, 1530-1780: 
Economic History of Britain, Vol. 2 (1969; repr. 1980), pp. 213-74. 
10
  The language of ‘Rights’ harked back to the 1628 Petition of Right, claiming intrinsic rights for the people, 
rather than grants by royal favour. The provisions of the 1689 Bill of Rights also drew ideas from the 1654 
Instrument of Government, drawn up at the start of Oliver Cromwell’s Protectorate: J.R. Tanner, English 
Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century, 1603-89 (Cambridge, 1962). 
11
  Further Acts of (limited) Toleration were passed for Scotland (1712) and Ireland (1719). 
12
  See J. Welwood, Vindication of the Present Great Revolution in England (London, 1689); and T. Beverley, 
The Late Great Revolution in this Nation … to be Duly Ascribed to the Supreme Spirit, now about to Move in 
the Fulfilling All Prophecy … (London, 1689). 
13
  Outside England, there certainly was fighting, which was bloody but not long protracted: the supporters of 
the departed James (Latin Jacobus), who were quickly named as Jacobites, were defeated by the Williamites 
in Scotland at the Battle of Dunkeld (Aug. 1689) and in Ireland at the Battle of the Boyne (July 1690). 
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names followed: the ‘Wonderful Revolution’, the ‘Happy Revolution’.
14
 And the version that 
stuck was euphoric. The ‘Glorious Revolution’ was a distinctly Whig nomenclature, 
reflecting the views of the moderate constitutionalists among the ruling gentry, merchants 
and professionals. Over time, this positive name became a standard usage, especially after the 
final Jacobite defeat in 1745.
15
 The terminology celebrated the connotations of Protestantism, 
nationalism, constitutionalism, and non-violence. Furthermore, a significant element of the 
perceived ‘glory’ of 1688/9 was the absence not only of civil war but also of social upheaval 
from below. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the English populace was not so much passive 
at William’s arrival but broadly acquiescent. James II had made himself unpopular by a series 
of high-handed actions. After William’s landing in south-west England, the citizens of Exeter 
were the first who had to decide. It would have been difficult for the Dutch invader to 
proceed, if a major regional capital had held out against him. Indeed, when William’s army 
first arrived outside the stout city walls, Exeter’s gates were obdurately closed.
16
 But a 
messenger went inside to parley. James’s supporters lost heart and some fled. Next day the 
West Gate was opened and William entered with civic pomp, attended by his army, many 
local gentlemen, and his exotic guards of 200 armed Swiss mercenaries, 200 Laplanders 
wearing bear-skins, and 200 Surinamese from the Dutch Republic’s south American colony. 
After that signal success, his march to London became an increasingly triumphal procession. 
William accordingly won with a public parade not a back-stairs coup d’état. The rebellious 
English people would have been quite capable of resisting him – but did not.  
William became, in his own restrained style, an iconic saviour. For Northern Ireland 
Protestants, he became a special favourite, familiarly known as ‘King Billy’. A celebrated 
painting depicted his landing at Torbay. In regal style, the would-be monarch sits easily 
astride a prancing white horse, his sword at the ready, and his ships just off-shore: a 
determined leader for the people, like a shining knight of old.
17
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  See R.B. [R. Burton, pseudonym of N. Crouch], The History of the House of Orange … A Brief Relation [of 
events] … till the Late Wonderful Revolution (London, 1693); and R. Steele, The Crisis: Or, a Discourse 
Representing the Just Causes of the Late Happy Revolution … With Some Seasonable Remarks on the 
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Praise to God for the Glorious Revolution, the Protestant Succession, and the Signal Successes and 
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  An inconspicuous plaque today records the site of the West Gate (demolished in 1815) and the city’s 
momentous decision in November 1688, which averted a potential civil war in England. 
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To be sure, objections can easily be made to the standard name for 1688/9. 
Generations of students have written essays debating the proposition that ‘The Glorious 
Revolution was neither glorious nor a revolution’. Historians still remain divided on the 
issue. Some downplay the novelty of these events, while others stress their radical nature.
18
 
Yet, since the politico-religious settlement was redrawn, there was certainly a ‘revolution’ in 
Aristotle’s broadest sense of a significant constitutional restructuring.  
When, much later, the political philosopher Edmund Burke asserted polemically that 
1688/9 entailed nothing more than ‘a small and a temporary deviation from the strict order of 
a regular hereditary succession’,
19
 he was wrong. The Bill of Rights included the phrase ‘the 
throne being thereby vacant’, following James II’s flight, which was taken to constitute his 
abdication. That declaration in itself represented more than a minor deviation. It flatly 
contradicted the first principle of hereditary monarchy. Theoretically, the throne is never 
vacant: ‘the king is dead, long live the king’. This time, however, it was declared legally to be 
so – as had occurred de facto between 1649 and the restoration of Charles II in 1660. 




 Following this crisis, ‘Revolution’ quickly became the accepted term of art for the 
overthrow of a tyrannical ruler, following by a new constitutional regime, guaranteeing  
specific rights for the people. William III as Prince of Orange had declared his cause to be 
‘for the preserving of the Protestant Religion, and for the restoring of the Laws and Liberties 
of England, Scotland, Ireland, etc’.
21
 The idea of restraining absolute monarchy had 
potentially European-wide appeal. One English observer in 1690 had a startling claim to 
prescience when he foretold the coming of similar revolution in France.
22
 In fact, this forecast 
proved to be just under 100 years premature. It showed, however, how infectious hopes were 
raised among English critics of absolute monarchy, especially the French variety. 
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  Among a huge literature, contrast W.A. Speck, Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 
1688 (Oxford, 1988), 211-51; and S.C.A. Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (New Haven, 2009). 
19
  E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London, 1790), ed. C.C. O’Brien (Harmondsworth, 
1979), p. 101. 
20
  Thus when Mary II died in 1694, William III remained unchallenged as king, although superior hereditary 
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Protestant and a descendant of the Stuarts, but far from the most senior in terms of strict hereditary right. 
21
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Whittle, ‘An Exact Diary of the Late Expedition of his Illustrious Highness, the Prince of Orange’ (1688): 
www.dsnell.zynet.co.uk/Guides/Word/William_III_in_Exeter.doc.  
22
  E. Petrie, The Fate of France: A Discourse, wherein … it is Showed that by the Happy Revolution in 
England, all the Designs of the French King for Universal Monarchy are Disappointed; and the Rational 
Grounds to believe his Downfall Near (London, 1690). 
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Given this legacy, it was not surprising that the revolt of the North American colonists 
in the 1770s generated talk of further ‘revolution’. They were fighting a war of independence, 
not only to oust a monarch who seemed to them a tyrant but also to establish a new republic. 
That was constitution-changing in a big way. Interestingly, some colonists had proposed 
finding a new king to replace George III. Perhaps the exiled ‘Bonnie’ Prince Charlie, the 
Jacobite Young Pretender, might cross the Atlantic to reclaim at least some of his long-lost 
patrimony?
23
 Drawing upon their Whig constitutional inheritance, however, the American 
rebels were ready to manage without a king, even while their elected Presidents were given 
extensive proto-monarchical prerogatives.  
Evidently, something dramatic was afoot – and something more far-reaching than a 
rerun of the ousting of James II in 1688/9. The ‘American Revolution’ was saluted in 
Philadelphia in 1779;
 24
 in France in 1781 by l’Abbé Reynal;
25
 and in Britain in 1784 by the 
Nonconformist minister Richard Price (his tract also being translated into French).
26
 Insofar 
as there was a single iconic hero of the American upheavals, he was George Washington. The 
first commander-in-chief and then first President was also portrayed on his white horse, 
symbolising purity. His dress is always shown as soldierly, never lavish; and, when he holds 
out a sword, it is extended not vengefully but with firm intent.
27
  
Again, however, there is scope for debate about the extent to which the American 
‘revolution’ was truly revolutionary. It remains a set topic for students to discuss. Historians 
too continue to disagree.
28
 All accept, however, that the disfiguring affront to liberty in the 
form of legally-accepted slavery in the southern colonies/states was not ended or even 
ameliorated by the events of 1776/83. In that regard, it could be argued that the American 
Civil War (1861-5) was a much delayed component of a protracted multi-staged struggle for 
freedom, which began in 1776 and did not really end even with the Emancipation 
                                                          
23
  M.G.H. Pittock, The Invention of Scotland: The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity, 1638 to the Present 
(1991), p. 194. 
24
  Anon. [Gouverneur Morris], Observations on the American Revolution (Philadelphia, 1779).  
25
  G.T.F. Reynal [l’Abbé Reynal], Révolution de l’Amérique (Paris and London, 1781). 
26
  See R. Price, Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution, and the Means of Making it a 
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de l’Amérique (1784). 
27
  P. Hannaford (ed.), The Essential George Washington: Two Hundred Years of Observation on the Man, the 
Myth, the Patriot (Vermont, 1999); W.E. Woodward, George Washington: The Image and the Man (New 
York, 1926). 
28
  Contrast J.P. Greene (ed.), The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits (New York, 1987); and idem 
(ed.), The Ambiguity of the American Revolution (New York, 1968); with, among many others, G.B. Nash, 






 Moreover, it should be acknowledged the oppression of the 
indigenous Americans was not halted by Independence.
30
 And the new ‘democratic’ Republic 
excluded all women from voting, as was customary at that time.
31
 Thus there were clear 
social limits to the extent of change. On the other hand, the settlement was undeniably radical 
in ending monarchy, in instituting a written constitution, and in throwing off the tutelage of a 
distant power. Hence the revolutionary tag became the standard name for the American 
struggle. And so it remains. 
Ultimately, however, it was the French Revolution that became the classic prototype. 
In its exuberance and in its terror, it overshadowed all its precursors. The events following 
upon the fall of the Bastille in July 1789 were immediately hailed as revolutionary, long 
before the French king was executed in January 1793.
32
 Moreover, the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man in August 1789, while picking up the terminology of the English Bill of 
Rights, went much further in its democratic and universalist implications.
33
 There was much 
popular involvement and conflict, both for and (in some regions) against the unfolding 
changes. As is well known, things became extraordinarily complex. France’s first Republic 
(1792-1804) was then up-ended by an upstart Emperor (1804-1814/15), who was followed by 
an eventual (though not permanent) restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815.  
During this saga, there was at one stage a chivalrous man on a white horse. He was 
General Lafayette, the French nobleman who had fought with the rebels in the American War 
of Independence and who in 1789-91 tried to broker a constitutionalist settlement in France. 
Perhaps he might have become the French equivalent of George Washington, as a new 
president?
34
 Yet no single person could embody all the complexities of the convulsions in 
France. Not Lafayette, who was ousted by the Jacobins; not Robespierre, who grossly overdid 
the Terror and was felled by his own guillotine; and not Napoleon (also depicted on a white 
horse) who after all turned the First Republic into Empire.  
                                                          
29
  For introductions to a massive bibliography, see S. Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Anti-
Slavery (Cambridge, 2009); G.B. Nash, The Forgotten Fifth (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); and J.P. Kaminski 
(ed.), A Necessary Evil? Slavery and the Debate over the Constitution (Madison, 1995). 
30
  See variously K.W. Townsend and M. Nicholas, First Americans: A History of Native Peoples (Boston, 
2013); and  F.E. Hoxie and others (eds), Native Americans and the Early Republic (Charlottesville, 1999). 
31
  See K. Taschek, Daughters of Liberty: The American Revolution and the Early Republic, 1775-1827 (New 
York, 2011). 
32
  For positive reactions, see W. Roscoe, The French Revolution: A Song (London, 1789?); and A. Geddes, A 
Secular Ode on the French Revolution, Translated from the Original Latin (London and Paris, 1790). For a 
sharply critical response, by contrast, see Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, cited above n.19. 
33
  J.I. Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution and Human Rights, 1750-90 (Oxford, 2011). 
34
  For G. du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, see B. Tuckerman, Life of General Lafayette: With a Critical 
Estimate of his Character and Public Acts (New York, 1889); and H.G. Unger, Lafayette (Hoboken, NJ., 
2002). An equestrian statue of Lafayette, with his sword aloft, can be viewed in Paris, on Cours la Reine, 
VIIIe arondissement, while many more monuments abound in the USA.    
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Instead, the most emblematic figure became the imagined Marianne, who was an 
anonymous woman of the downtrodden people. Symbolically, she was simultaneously a 
nurturing mother, a passionate fighter for Republican liberty, and a secularised madonna.
35
 
Her image memorialised the mass participation that made the French Revolution so much the 
paradigmatic political revolution, notwithstanding the fact that full female voting rights were 
not actually granted in France until 1944. 
Of course, there always remains scope for debate as to how revolutionary was this 
great popular upheaval, both at the time and in the long term.
36
 And the same applies to other 
similar events. To take another example, Isaac Deutscher in 1967 gave an elegantly 
revisionist account of the Communist Revolution of 1917. He saw the outcome of its 
radicalism as being new-communist whilst still remaining deeply old-Russian.
37
 Since the 
central government remained as or even more autocratic under Soviet rule as it had been 
under the Tsars, Deutscher’s perception was a just one. Nonetheless, the Communist 
movement detected a classic sequence of popular topplings of tyrants at times of economic 
crisis: the English, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, and the Cuban Revolutions.  
But that endorsement has by no means monopolised the terminology. So post-1989 
the popular uprisings against the Marx-inspired communist regimes have also been dubbed 
‘revolutions’ rather than, from a Marxist viewpoint, as ‘counter-revolutions’. These 
democratic movements, being broadly non-violent, are given gentle names. They range from 
the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia (1989)
38
 to the Rose Revolution in Georgia 
(2003),
39
 Orange Revolution in the Ukraine (2004),
40
 and so forth.
41
 But, again, their 
radicalism remains open to debate (and remains to be seen). Moreover, in the long run, the 
often-masked power of continuity gives its own collateral verdict.
42
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  I. Deutscher, The Unfinished Revolution: Russia, 1917-67 (Oxford, 1967).  
38
  J.F.N. Bradley, Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution: A Political Analysis (New York, 1992). 
39
  G.C. Monson, Georgia after the Rose Revolution (New York, 2009). 
40
  A. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven, Conn., 2005). 
41
  These upheavals are often known collectively as ‘colour’ revolutions, even though far from all the names are 
actually those of colours: see e.g. L.A. Mitchell, The Colour Revolutions (Philadelphia, 2013). 
42
  P.J. Corfield, Time and the Shape of History (London, 2007), pp. 26-48; and idem, ‘Why is the Formidable 
Power of Continuity so often Overlooked?’ (Nov. 2010), Blog/1 on website: www.penelopejcorfield.co.uk.  
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Today, the term risks becoming applied too widely. References to a ‘Twitter 
Revolution’ and/or a ‘Facebook Revolution’, electronically generated by the social media, 
often contain a significant element of hype.
43
 Nonetheless, the concept has evolved a clear 
meaning in political context. It refers to the mass overthrowing of an autocracy (whether 
violently or otherwise) which leads to constitutional regime change, in the name of the 
people, usually with a democratic or popular franchise (albeit sometimes excluding particular 
groups).  
Hence ‘revolution’ is the accepted name for many historic and current political 
upheavals. Indeed, however much the revolutionary nature of particular conflagrations, old 
and new, remains disputed by students and historians, the name is unlikely to be dislodged.     
 
Industrial Revolution 
Sympathetic borrowing then spread the remit of this powerful word. By the nineteenth 
century, onlookers were increasingly impressed by the massive technological transformations 
of the economies of first Britain, then France, the USA, Germany and an increasing number 
of countries around the world. Political language provided an obvious resource. Three 
summary ‘revolutionary’ usages came: in French from the economist Jérôme-Adolphe 
Blanqui – ‘la revolution industrielle’ (1837);
44
 in German from the manufacturer and 
communist theorist Friedrich Engels – ‘eine industrielle Revolution’ (1844);
45
 and in English 
from the historian and social reformer Arnold Toynbee – ‘the Industrial Revolution’ (1881; in 
print 1884).
46
 This evocative name then gained general currency and remains in popular 
usage today. 
 Not surprisingly, given the difficulties of distilling complex changes into simple 
phrases, this identification has been much challenged too. Was there ‘an’ industrial revolution 
or instead a long process of ‘industrialisation’? Hence did economic transformation really 
stem from one dramatic upheaval or is it better understood as cumulative and evolutionary? If 
there were big changes, did these processes entail an immediately malign ‘immiseration’ of 
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  Among numerous commentaries, see J.H. Parmalee and S.L. Bichard, Politics and the Twitter Revolution: 
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  F. Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1845 (Leipzig, 1845; in Engl. transl., London, 
1887).  
46
  A. Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England (London, 1884).  
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the working class? Or produce a beneficial long-term improvement in living standards?
47
 Or 
a widening gulf between rich and poor, no matter whether absolute poverty was alleviated or 
not? Given such uncertainties, was the early impact of technological innovation as 
widespread or drastic as used to be thought?  
 Indeed, had any really significant changes occurred before 1800? After all, the classic 
name for the Industrial Revolution did not appear in general currency before the 1880s, fully 
100 years after the 1780s, which (by some accounts) is termed the decade of developmental 
‘take-off’?
48
 Put simply, is the Industrial Revolution really a ‘myth’?
49
 
 Part of the definitional problems stem from the contrasting natures of political and 
economic transformations. They may both have massive effects in the long term. But, in their 
immediate form, they differ. Political conflagrations may have long prior causes but they tend 
to explode in dramatic convulsions of the body politic. The events are noticeable and 
preoccupying. People have to take sides – indeed, big political revolutions (as in the English, 
American, French, Russian and Chinese examples) all contained elements of outright civil 
war. Industrial transformations, by contrast, also have long lead times but may start 
incrementally, almost unnoticeably – and they don’t usually lead to civil war, although they 
may promote exploitative warfare and commercial aggression overseas. 
 Within Marxist orthodoxy, of course, the really big upheavals were deemed to 
constitute both an economic transition and a political revolution in one: a bourgeois 
transformation from feudalism to capitalism in the case of the English
50
 and French 
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 a proletarian transformation from capitalism to communism in the case of 
Russia in October 1917
52
 and China in 1949.
53
 Yet those linkages proved hard to substantiate. 
Even fellow Marxist historians notably disagreed as to when key transitions from great epoch 
to great epoch were supposed to have occurred.
54
  
 Some theorists tried to finesse the difficulties. Sub-stages are introduced, such as, in 
Europe, ‘mercantile capitalism’ as the precursor of ‘industrial capitalism’. Or, in the East, the 
special ‘Asiatic mode of production’. But the inevitable progression within Marxist history of 
one discrete economic epoch after another, in a globally applicable sequence, was thus 
sullied. Orthodox communists, including Josef Stalin, sternly disapproved.
55
  
 Yet the lesson of all these variants was clear. Historically significant economic 
transformations remain complex and their ramifications are often hard to date with precision. 
Changes can be slow-moving as well as immediate and dramatic; broad similarities can be 
detected but also many regional and sub-regional variations.  
 Furthermore, once notable economic crises have died down, the underlying structures 
may prove to have changed less than at first seemed to be the case. For example, ‘capitalism’ 
while often deemed by Marxists to be on its last legs,
56
 has proved notably resilient and 
adaptable. It has taken different forms within different national and cultural traditions.
57
 As a 
result, it has proved impossible to fit all these different political and economic ‘revolutions’ 
neatly together. 
 Nevertheless, major technological transformations do occur, on their own timetables. 
The outcome of the debates has broadly upheld the fact that various eighteenth-century 
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inventions, like the application of steam power, proved ultimately of massive significance. In 
the long run, the combined forces of commercialisation, urbanisation and industrialisation are 
generating a world-historical ‘macro-change’. Historians still disagree on the details and 
implications. Yet quietly the ‘myth-argument’ has vanished. Some prefer to write about 
Britain’s economic development without referring to ‘the Industrial Revolution’, since many 
changes were evolutionary.
58




 A very few literal-minded historians, it is true, do sometimes argue that there could be 
no such development as the Industrial Revolution before the name existed. Yet that objection, 
and the assumption behind it, should be firmly rejected. In the first place, numerous things 
with names don’t exist in material form (e.g. unicorns, dragons)
60
 while things without 
names may exist long before they are identified and named (e.g. infectious diseases). In 
particular, long-term trends generally take considerable periods of time before they become 
generally known and named. And, in the second place, there were in fact many miscellaneous 
references in eighteenth-century Britain to profound social, cultural, and technological 
innovations. These variants (discussed in the next section) provided a linguistic seedbed from 
which new terminologies eventually emerged.  
 My own preference is to differentiate political from industrial revolutions, by terming 
the latter Macro-Transformations. Yet while historians may propose, linguistic communities 
dispose. The known terminology has behind it (paradoxically) the great power of continuity. 
Hence the complex processes of Industrialisation are likely to continue starring as ‘the 
Industrial Revolution’ for some time to come.
61
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Socio/ Cultural/ Economic Revolution 
All these terminological changes were part of a long-term shift in majority perceptions, in 
western Europe and north America, from cyclical to linear Time.
62
 Of course, deeply rooted 
attitudes did not change in complete synchronisation. A minority continued to espouse 
cyclical models of change: ‘what goes round comes round’. The cyclical histories by Oswald 
Spengler and Arnold J. Toynbee in the early and mid-twentieth century are famous 
examples.
63
 However, linearity has gradually become the default assumption in the West,
64
 
even to the extent that many people find it hard to imagine that earlier societies viewed things 
differently. Thus great revolutions (whether industrial or political) were no longer seen as 
conventional stages in a repetitive cycle but rather as new milestones on history’s unique 
journey.  
 Interestingly, one indicative sign of a strengthened linearity was the novel habit of 
numbering the centuries in sequential order.
65
 A pioneering example in England was a study 
by a clerical historian, who invited readers in 1756/7 to study The Ecclesiastical History of 
England to the Eighteenth Century. People in earlier eras often contrasted ‘time out of mind’ 
with ‘nowadays’; and, if they sought greater precision for religious or administrative 
purposes, counted individual years.
66
 But thinking in terms of successive centuries 
encouraged a sense of history’s grand sweep, incorporating substantial differences between 
past and future. A classic example came from Denis Diderot, when confidently justifying his 
Enyclopédie. He announced that it would ‘collect all the knowledge scattered over the face of 
the earth’ and ‘transmit this to those who will come after us, so that the work of past centuries 
may be useful to the following centuries’.
67
 Each hundred-year span became unique. So in 
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1800 an  Anglican preacher greeted, rather nervously, the ‘solemn Spectacle’ of the incoming 
nineteenth century, with the thought that the world was being ‘launching into the current of 
an unexplored AGE, without knowing whither the tide will carry us’.
68
 
 Revolutionary terminology fitted easily into this sort of mind-set. Change might 
generate the unexpected. Throughout the eighteenth century, the term was used in a variety of 
socio-cultural contexts. One case came from the Whig essayist Joseph Addison in 1711. He 
observed in The Spectator that: ‘I must observe a very great revolution that has happened in 
this article of good-breeding [manners]’.
69
 He was jokingly contrasting a shift in styles: while 
city society had been traditionally ceremonious, country folk had been characterised by rustic 
simplicity. Yet in his own day, when smart society was abandoning excess formality, the 
country people were adopting stately ceremony. A further letter to the Spectator playfully put 
the story into geo-physical form, suggesting that, with every mile away from London, both 
dress and manners became more and more old-fashioned. Travellers could thus move 
backwards through time as they left the metropolis and headed into the provinces.
70
 In reality, 
needless to say, that picture was not literally accurate.
71
 This spatio-temporal assumption, 
however, implied that the expanding metropolis of London was in the vanguard of history’s 
progression. And, in fact, by 1700 England’s capital city was already experiencing something 
truly novel. Not only had it already surpassed in population its old rival, Paris but it was on 
the way to becoming by 1800 one of a select handful of million+ cities world-wide.
72
 
 International commerce was one of the key factors promoting economic 
transformation, both as cause and consequence. Hence another commentator in the Spectator 
wrote presciently in May 1711 that: ‘Trade, without enlarging the British territories, has 
given us a Kind of additional Empire’.
73
 And before long, the country’s existing colonial 
possessions were being expanded and new ones added.  
 Daniel Defoe, the ever prolific wordsmith, defined the impact of commerce in the 
new vocabulary of upheaval. There has been a ‘Revolution of Trade’, he announced in 1728, 
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adding that the ‘Revolution in Trade, brought a Revolution in the very Nature of Things’. As 
a result, he argued, the poor no longer lived as dependent peasantry, toiling ‘for Cottages and 
[feudal] Liveries’ but worked instead ‘for Money, and to live, as we say, at their own 
hands.’
74
 Again, his verdict, like many a snappy dictum, was exaggerated. The monetisation 
of the British economy was a very long process. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, 
confident references to the country’s growing trading power were commonplace. Together, 
these commentaries signified a long-term process of commercialisation, tagged by some later 
economic historians, with a nod to Defoe, as a ‘commercial revolution’,
75
 or, in heterodox 
Marxist terms, as the advent of ‘commercial capitalism’. 
 Complex socio-economic changes, however, were harder to pin down and to name 
than were political upheavals. Mid-eighteenth-century commentators were often vague and 
indeterminate. The world was ‘turn’d upside down’. Things were ‘topsy-turvy’. Traditional 
and formal distinctions of ‘rank’ and degree were mutating into what began as a much more 
flexible language of ill-defined social ‘class’.
76
 Distinctions between rich and poor had 
certainly not disappeared. Yet there was now a growing and diversifying middle stratum, 
with a greater acquisition of wealth and a visible display of conspicuous consumer goods. In 
1754, two more sweeping declarations showed both the sense of change and a lack of 
precision in defining it: 
77
  
Were the same persons, who made a full tour of England thirty years ago, to make a 
fresh one now, they would find themselves in a land of enchantment [wrote one 
onlooker in the Gentleman’s Magazine]. England is no more like to what England was 
then it resembles Borneo or Madagascar.  
 
 Also in 1754 an anonymous ‘Rusticus’ averred in the Connoisseur that:  
Very extraordinary revolutions have already happened in the habits of this kingdom; and, 
as dress is subject to unaccountable changes, posterity may perhaps see without surprise 
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Here the author’s satirical prediction turned out to be halfway correct. 250 years later, many 
women in Britain do wear trousers (with or without ‘strutting’), although in the western world it 
is still unusual for men to wear dresses, notwithstanding the sporting of a dashing sarong in June 
1998 by the fashion icon, footballer David Beckham.  
 Over time, the eighteenth-century commentator’s tones tended to become more 
enthusiastic. In 1767, for instance, a report on new turnpike roads and early canals remarked 
excitedly that ‘never was a more astonishing Revolution’ than in England’s transport in recent 
years, with new canals and turnpike roads. As a result, the mobility of goods and people became 
much easier. The English were literally ‘released from treading the cautious steps of our 
forefathers’.
79
 By the early 1780s, the Encyclopaedia Britannica was happy to observe that: 
‘The discoveries and improvements of the age ... diffuse a glory over this country unattainable 
by conquest or dominion’.
80
  
 Needless to say, not everyone approved of every trend. The cleric-cum-economist Dean 
Tucker, who was signally impressed with the new wealth and size of England’s inland 
manufacturing towns, expressed alarm at apparent changes in gender roles – always a sensitive 
issue. Seeing women making advances to men in the social throng at fashionable resort city of 
Bath in 1783, he sighed that ‘revolutionary principles are continually gaining ground’.
81
 In fact, 
it may be doubted whether female initiative in courtship was truly a novelty. The point was 
rather that the social mingling and relaxation of traditional restraints was part of the country’s 
diversifying urbanisation, in which Bath was a magnificent urban showcase for conspicuous 
consumption, cultivated leisure, urban entertainments and commercialised medicine.
82
 
Interestingly, Tucker’s nervous apprehension also implied a linear rather than cyclical view. His 
fears offered a pertinent reminder that linearity can encompass what is seen as change-for-the-
worse as well as vice versa. Changes in sexual mores are a case in point. Behaviours, which for 
some constitute liberation from stuffy conventionality, may represent, for others, a shocking 
collapse of public standards and personal morals.
83
  
 Together, these overview comments (and many others like them) on 
socio/economic/cultural change in eighteenth-century Britain have a number of common 
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characteristics. They tend to be sweeping and generalised, often lacking specific details. They 
are certain that things are changing but often unsure precisely how to name the trends. 
Increasingly, they appear to be expecting further transformations to follow, rather than a 
reversion to olden times. Their open-endedness hence tended to indicate linear rather than 
cyclical assumptions. For example, some pioneering medical reformers begin to urge that the 
hideous disease of smallpox could be eradicated, not only in Britain but throughout the world (as 
was, remarkably, achieved within 200 years).
84
 Often the emphasis is upon generic social and 
cultural transition, but sometimes specific economic and technological innovations are noted.  
 Transformations of this kind are generally assumed to be non-violent and gradualist. 
Evolution is subsumed within the word ‘revolution’, referring to the magnitude of the outcomes 
of even many small incremental changes. And the tone, especially when invoking technology, 
becomes increasingly optimistic over time – even euphoric. An admirer of the power of science 
in 1836 was particularly rhapsodic about the advent of a completely new world. No cyclical 
history for him: ‘The world will take a quite different appearance than it has had hitherto to man; 
productive of a thousand times more means for human happiness, than the human race may be 
wanting; – a paradise beyond the common conceptions’.85 The eighteenth-century mantra of 
Improvement is mutating visibly into the Victorian confidence in Progress.
86
  
There is no agreement between these contemporary commentators about a single start 
date for fundamental change. Defoe might correctly trace England’s overseas commercial 
development back to Elizabethan times but others tended to make comparisons (as is often done) 
with the generation before their own or with life before some big event in recent times. 
One justly celebrated account, penned in 1807 by the poet-cum-historian-and-essayist 
Robert Southey, deserves reconsideration in this context. Initially, his analysis appeared under a 
pseudonym, in the guise of Letters from England, Translated from the Spanish. Pretending to be 
a curious outsider was a well-known literary device which allowed an author to draw fresh 
attention to quotidian developments that were otherwise too easily taken for granted. Southey’s 
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imaginary Spanish gentleman was far from happy with every trend but he was mightily certain 
that multitudinous transformations were afoot, and dramatic ones too:
87
   
 
Perhaps no kingdom ever experienced so great a change in so short a course of years, 
without some violent state convulsion, as England has done during the present reign [i.e. 
post-1760]. I wish I could procure materials to show the whole contrast: – A metropolis 
doubled in extent; taxes quintupled; the value of money depreciated as rapidly as if new 
mines had been discovered; canals cut from one end of the island to the other; travelling 
made so expeditious that the internal communication is tenfold what it was; the invention 
of the steam-engine, almost as great an epocha as the invention of printing; the 
manufacturing system carried to its utmost point; the spirit of commerce extended to 
every thing; an empire lost in America, and another gained in the East: – these would be 
parts of the picture. The alteration extends to the minutest things, even to the dress and 
manners of every rank of society.  
 
Four specific points about this listing are worth highlighting. In the first place, it’s very 
comprehensive, embracing urban, financial, transportation, technological, industrial, commercial, 
imperial and social trends. All these have been celebrated (and in some cases also debunked) by 
later historians, often under the title of ‘revolution’. Secondly, the timetabling seems clear but 
cannot be taken too literally. Southey’s summary suggested that all these novel developments 
had taken place since 1760, while earlier commentators (writing before that date) had also 
projected the origins of change backwards by some generations. Complex transformations turn 
out to have many complex birth-dates.     
Thirdly, Southey’s commentary shows that educated contemporaries by the early 
nineteenth century were no longer lamenting the loss of the American colonies but were instead 
celebrating the buoyant speed of Britain’s imperial expansion in India. Majority opinion was 
directed outwards, untroubled as yet by anti-colonialism. And, fourthly and very notably, there is 
Southey’s quick and just appreciation of the impact of technological innovations: the new steam 
engine, put on a par with the advent of printing; and the new ‘manufacturing system’. So no 
‘Industrial Revolution’ in so many words; but a verbal equivalent. In 1815, Robert Owen’s 
Observations on the Effect of the Manufacturing System picked up the term,
88
 confident that it 
would be understood by his readers. These usages were acknowledging not just the growth of 
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Even the astute Southey, however, did not cover everything. He might have mentioned the 
growing use of inoculation, followed by vaccination, against smallpox. That development led the 
way towards today’s world-wide medical intervention against infectious diseases and 
preventable illnesses. He might have mentioned the onset of unprecedented global population 
growth, triggered both by rising fertility and by declining mortality, especially among the very 
young. Or the spread of literacy, among women as well as men. Or the emergence of the 
professions. And he might have mentioned the pioneering experiments to tame electricity – 
which ultimately became even more potent in its applications than the steam-engine. But it’s 
hard to identify absolutely every significant long-term trend that is unfolding under one’s nose. 
(Can you?)      
  Collectively, these eighteenth-century comments added up to a strong acknowledgement 
of insidious and complex innovations, whether for praise or blame.
90
 Change did not preclude 
the survival of continuity. As already noted, that pervasive feature of life has its own power and 
tenacity. But the balance between continuity and change was shifting in the course of the long 
eighteenth century, even if not every implication was immediately apparent. A French visitor to 
Britain in 1816, who arrived expecting the victor nation of the prolonged European fighting to be 
exhausted, was astonished at the country’s affluence. As the dynamic hub of its international 
networks, it displayed an ‘unlooked for opulence, [which] overflowed with its treasures the 
British Empire’.
91
 All such comments, of course, remain subjective, some more so than others. 
Yet together they spelt fundamental change.     
 
Varieties of Macro-Change 
Scholars have been earnestly debating these terms and themes at least since Arnold Toynbee’s 
days. But it’s clear that a subtler and more varied vocabulary is needed for purposes of 
clarification. As it is, one common pattern is for a bold historian to identify a new ‘revolution’, 
only to be followed by a chorus of criticism cutting these claims down to size. Or at times it 
works in reverse. A bold new revisionist study debunks an upheaval that has the name of 
‘revolution’ and a debate follows to restore its revolutionary status.  
 Students of eighteenth-century Britain often express bewilderment at the proliferation of 
rival claims and the absence of consensus, after more than a century of debates since the 1880s. 
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  Cited in George, England in Transition, p. 112. 
22 
 
Was the long eighteenth century a period of conservative tradition or one of modernising 
innovation?
92
 One of neo-feudal aristocratic revival
93
 or post-revolutionary commercial/ 
imperial expansion?
94
 Was it a stable, deferential and pious society dedicated to ‘church and 
king’?
95




 Was there also a gender revolution?
97
 A sexual revolution?
98
 The advent of the 
modern family?
99
 The invention of the ‘modern’ personality?
100
 Was there an Enlightenment 
in Europe or not? And, if so, did the offshore British Isles partake in the process?
101
  
 Can the economy in these years be helpfully defined as ‘capitalist’?
102
 And, if so, of 
what sort? Or ‘mercantilist’? And if so, meaning what exactly?
103
 Was there a financial 
revolution?
104
 An agricultural revolution?
105
 A commercial revolution?
106
 A transport 
revolution?
107
 A consumer revolution?
108
  
                                                          
92
  For the eighteenth-century debates at different times,
 
compare overviews by F. O’Gorman, ‘The Recent 
Historiography of the Hanoverian Regime’, Historical Journal, 29 (1986), pp. 1005-20; and P.J. Corfield, 
‘British History: The Exploding Galaxy’, Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 34 (2011), pp. 517-26.
 
93
  As argued by H. Wellenreuther, Repräsentation und Grossgrundbesitz in England, 1730-70 (Stuttgart, 
1979). 
94
  See e.g. C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons 
(Oxford, 2004). 
95
  For two contrastingly different conservative interpretations from different generations, see L.B. Namier, The 
Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (London, 1929), esp. Vol. 1, pp. 1-76; and J.C.D. Clark, 
English Society, 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice (Cambridge, 1985 edn). 
96
   Contrast views in J. Morris, ‘Secularisation and Religious Experience’, Historical Journal, 55 (2012), pp. 
195-219; D. Erdozain, ‘“Cause is not Quite What it Used to be”: The Return of Secularisation’, English 
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 Or, yet again, was there an interim stage of proto-industrialisation?
109
 Was there (as 
already noted) a big-bang eighteenth-century Industrial Revolution or a slow-moving 
Industrious Revolution; or was the whole idea nothing but a myth?
110
 Did the era actually 
‘unbind Prometheus’ by setting science free to revolutionise production (Prometheus being a 
mythic figure who represented the spirit of scientific enquiry)? Or are claims for a scientific 
revolution overdone?
111
 And, above all, can any or all of these conflicting verdicts be 
reconciled?    
 It’s helpful, when responding, to begin by differentiating between different sorts of 
revolution/evolution. Often one term is used when the other is really what is meant. Hence let  
historians stick to ‘revolution’ as the well-established name for great political overthrows of 
tyrannies which lead to democratic (or constitutional) regime change, taking the French 
Revolution as the paradigm case.  
At the same time, however, let’s also talk about ‘transformations’ or evolution or macro-
change for epic long-term developments, which take place incrementally, often with many short-
term oscillations. It is true that Evolution
112
 just does not have the same radical ring to it as does 
Revolution. Nonetheless, the fact that many forms of socio/cultural/intellectual transformations 
may be slow in their unfolding does not detract from their massive significance over time.  
Finally, three contrasting late eighteenth-century usages highlight again the case for 
linguistic variegation. The following three references to ‘revolution’ are all approving in tone. 
Yet their applications are very different. Viewing events in France with enthusiasm, Thomas 
Paine announced in 1790 that ‘The Revolution in France is certainly a forerunner of other 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(London, 1966), focusing upon the long nineteenth century. A later synthesis sees lengthy evolution 
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(Reading, 1973). 
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111
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 The context was clearly socio/political, and the impact both immediate and long-
term.
114
 Two years earlier, the agricultural writer Arthur Young welcomed the successful 
technology transfer of mechanised spinning between England’s cotton to woollen industries. ‘A 
revolution is making’, he noted presciently. Here the context was socio/industrial, and the pace 
of change at times rapid, at times evolutionary. And in 1791 the Dissenting clergyman-cum-
chemist-cum-political-theorist Joseph Priestley mused happily upon the spread of literacy and 
education: ‘We may all perceive that we must be at the eve of great revolutions, such as will 
rouse the faculties, and call forth the exertions of great numbers [of people], at present, 
probably, unknown’.
115
 The context, this time, was socio/cultural and the pace of change, 
although not its significance, was generally slow but hard to reverse. 
 These three authors were all sharply perceptive. They were, however, clearly naming 
different modes and types of historical development. For them, the powerful word ‘revolution’ 
came to mind. Yet, after so many debates, it’s time for today’s analysts to find a more 
sophisticated and variegated vocabulary. There are plenty of choices, from Transformation or 
Macro-Change to Evolution or Micro-Change.
116
 Moreover, let’s avoid having to decide 
between either/or alternatives. Long-term developments are not obliged to be only rapid 
throughout or only slow-paced. Sometimes they are modulated, varying in momentum over 
time. Come on, colleagues! Time to differentiate our REVOLLUSIONS! 
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